THE PROBLEMATIC OF THEORY-PRACTICE IN HISTORICAL EVOLUTION OF TURKISH FOREIGN POLICY

TÜRK DIŞ POLITİKASININ TARİHSEL EVRİMİNDE TEORİ-PRATİK SORUNSALI

Dr. Bülent AKKUŞ
Istanbul University, Faculty of Economics, Department of Political Science and International Relations, Istanbul/TURKEY

Res. Asst. Yeliz YAZAN KOÇ
Istanbul University, Faculty of Economics, Department of Political Science and International Relations, Istanbul/TURKEY

Article Type: Research Article / Araştırma Makalesi
Doi Number: http://dx.doi.org/10.26449/sssj.1816

ÖZ

The foreign policy realm is the most delicate area for states. It is a realm where in theory states contact or enter into positive or negative relations with their equals. In practice, however, it is a realm where states carry out such relations, exchanges on the basis of cooperation or conflict with other states and even non-state actors in an unofficial hierarchy. Given its importance, the foreign policy-diplomacy realm calls for a theoretical framework, orientation and targeting. The courses of action or attitudes states adopt in foreign policies or political maneuvers should be directed towards a certain goal or set of goals, or be based on a consistent and holistic strategy connecting the tactics to the goal. Otherwise, they are doomed to yield to inconsistent, stumbling foreign policies that will not reach the intended goals and fluctuate in the current political state. This study deals with the theory-practice problem taking Turkey as its case study. We discuss the relationships between the foreign policy-theory and practice from the perspectives of theoretical approaches. In line with this goal, the authors examine the balance between theory, rhetoric and practice taking other dynamics into considerations as well.

Key Words: Foreign Policy, The Theory-Practice Problem, Turkish Foreign Policy, Turkey

ABSTRACT


Anahtar Kelimeler: Dış Politika, Teori-Pratik Sorunsalı, Türk Dış Politikası, Türkiye
1. INTRODUCTION: RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN THEORY AND PRACTICE IN FOREIGN POLICY

It is difficult to demonstrate the relationship between theory and practice in absolute and ancient terms (Davutoğlu, 2013: 133). The continued theory-policy relationship in both national and international politics has to be based on questions such as “Is theory a result of the suspicions about practical actions, or a ground on which actions and preferences put into practice in other words justified? What does theory mean to explain political reality and what kind of opportunities it offers?” Although it is claimed that “the theory oriented to practical actions is perhaps the least theoretical (Nardin, 2013: 380)”, this study depends on the validity and reliability of perspective and theory. The reliability of a theory is based on the expression, it has to be tested in concrete practice and means in the field. Indeed, the theory gets objective validity and produces rational frameworks. This allows a theory to appreciate and provide opportunities in finding the application area (Davutoğlu, 2013: 133).

In the international area many countries act within the framework of “Theory is always for someone and for a target (Cox, 1996: 207).” approach establishing the relationship between theory and practice in foreign policy. Alfred Thayer Mahan and Nicholas John Spykman’s global strategies, which they put forward for United States, on long-term effect on foreign policy in the US is the most obvious indicator of this. Likewise, Karl Haushofer’s strategy for Germany, Halford Mackinder’s strategies for both England and Russia have played an important role in these countries’ foreign policies. Samuel Huntington and Francis Fukuyama’s strategies in the 20th century for the US reveal the importance of harmony between theory and practice in foreign policy more clearly. Foreign policy strategies which are based on theoretical framework are successful.¹ Because the theory, which is a systematic information integrity, assumes the task of being a guide for practice to the policy-maker with the scientific studies. However, policy-makers in the administration side of the business act within the framework of a shorter-term consideration in order to ensure the continuity of their powers, and for this purpose the usage of foreign policy towards gain in the international politics rather than to act in a long-term framework of strategic theory. The most important element of this is the reality of the international relations in the international area is the premise of the theory (Han, 2004, 117). At this point, Niccolò Machiavelli suggests that historical experience affects the managers’ behavior by saying “instead of the design, going after the existing reality is more consistently (Machiavelli, 1999: 151-153)”. Because of mentioned reasons, policy-makers prefer distancing themselves from theorists.² At this point, the friction between theorists and practitioners becomes inevitable. However, policy-makers who take all responsibility of production process in other words who have constitutionalism, are one step ahead. Policy-makers find theorists’ efforts insufficient for the reasons discussed above (Hill, 1994: 5). In Christopher Hill’s words, such persons are characterized as “self-appointed estate, technical or crate” by policy-makers (Hill, 1994: 5). As aforementioned, the friction between theorists and policy-makers occurs because of the reading format of “country facts” and “international facts”. At this point, policy-makers are in pursuit of power; theoreticians or academics are in pursuit of truth (Han, 2004, 117). The most vital thing for policy-makers is the continuity of their power. For this, the power is important, not the truth. Indeed, as Hans Morgenthau stressed: “Truth threatens power, power threatens truth; threatening the power of truth (Morgenthau, 1970: 14).”

Even though policy-makers’ being in pursuit of power instead of truth is understandable for their powers’ continuity, the power and the importance of the theory can be better understood when it is thought in the interests of the country rather than in the hands of those who have power. The consistent theory which has long-term problem solving ability and based on “country realities” and “international realities” move a step further by removing step towards the identification of the country’s politics to save the day. Considering the history, theory allows to analyze events multi-dimensionally and from a cause-effect perspective by evaluating the incident at the time. A properly executed theory gives the country an opportunity to carry out forecasts and projections for the future. Stephen M. Walt draws attention to it by saying, “There is an inevitable link between the theory’s abstract world and policy-maker’s real world (Walt, 1998: 29).”

¹ The big names of the political realist theory, especially Morgenthau, have an on the US decision-makers. Many foreign policy experts, political scientists, academics remained under the influence of political realism theory that created by him. And those people always take place in the US governments. Thus, Georg Shultz, the foreign minister of George (Father) of the Bush-era, specified in his National Committee on American Foreign Policy’s annually Hans J. Morgenthau ceremony’s speech, after World War II Morgenthau’s opinions shaped US public thinking on international environment and role of the USA in this environment. To Shultz, if Morgenthau’s views and leadership were not, American foreign policy would be in a different spot (Shultz, 1995: 282-286).
² Some of the leading researches find strange this attitudes of practitioners; they even find them right to a certain extent. For example, on topic, Stephen M. Walt, qualifies foreign policy conductors’ ignorance of academic theorists as “it must be admitted that often for good reasons” situation (Walt, 1998: 29).
It is necessary to act within the framework of a certain theory by analyzing the events experienced in the past, and the events experienced in the time period, and the rapid and intense developments experienced in today’s world where globalization rapidly increases the effect and the time, space and rules are overcome by means of cyber space. In this process, it is important to make sense of the data in a specific frame. In this way, it is possible to make predictions for the future in line with the interests of the country based on the data that are meaningful in a certain cause-effect relationship. At this point, the benefit of the practice cannot be ignored.

It is necessary to edit data in a specific context, to make them meaningful in order to attach meaning to them. Undoubtedly the world’s perception of theorists in the editing and meaning stage is important. At this point, the principles guiding the people’s world perception have great importance. Both policy-makers by ignoring theory for their continuous power and theorists by making mistake on objective and rational act may cause problems for theory’s reliability and validity. In the words of Walt, “If a person’s basic regulatory principles are defective, it is difficult to configure a successful policy-making and to build up a good theory without having extensive knowledge of the real world.” And this requires long-term and full examination of the process. Thus, in the interests of country and with the framework of healthier decisions, policies can be made by putting forward main factors affecting the process.

The most important factor in foreign policy is to consider the realities of the international system and the country’s real objective and rational way. At this point, there is a great role for policy-makers. For this purpose, policy-makers should have the ability to predict long-term problems with foresight. Predicting the problem corresponds to the first step of diagnosing a disease. At the second phase, which is the treatment of the disease, policy-makers should demonstrate their wish of problem-solving in the strategic theory framework in order to eliminate the problem as much as possible.

This study, which reveals the relationship between theory and practice in the context of theoretical approaches in foreign policy so far, is intended to create a theoretical background for the following sections of the study. The second part of the work, analyzes the theory and practice problematic in the case of Turkey’s foreign policy within the framework of visually of the background. In this context, the historical evolution of Turkish foreign policy issues such as the following are addressed: “Is there a theoretical framework that directs foreign policy actions and trends? If yes, how consistent or successful is it? If no, what is the reason for lack thereof and what damage might have risen historically and today due to its absence? What kind of repercussions will occur in the future? (Walt, 1998: 29)”. The study focuses on these questions. In the conclusion part of the study, in the light of the obtained data, predictions and recommendations will be put forward in parallel with the criticisms about the lack of theory and the theory-practice mismatch from a critical point of view. In this direction, the study intends to put forward a ground for holistic principles for foreign policy.

2. THE HISTORICAL EVOLUTION OF TURKISH FOREIGN POLICY

2.1. Turkish Foreign Policy during Atatürk’s Era

In the years following the First World War, the sole purpose of Turkey, which struggled in the War of Independence for “existing”, was to ensure the independence of foreign policy. During the war, the country acted on the basis of “independence on the basis of realism” principle (Oran, 2012: 104). By exploiting the rivalry between the great powers, Turkey took advantage of international balance in a good way although the war was against the West. Even though liberation struggle contains revisionism, in line with Atatürk’s realism and tactics, Turkey became aware of the limits of its power and took appropriate steps. Turkey had strived in line with National Pact (Mîsâk-ı Millî) principles and concrete, well-founded purposes. In accordance with the spirit of the period, although a capitalist idea had been adopted, the capitalism did not include an imperialist thinking. The foreign policy system of the period had adopted anti-systemic revisionist policy which jeopardized the system.

In the period following the establishment of the Republic, Turkey’s foreign policy was planned and carried out in the leadership of Atatürk with other relevant persons and institutions. In this period, although Atatürk had imposed extensively his views on people around him, the best examples of national organization and collective work had been seen in foreign policy (Gönlübol, 1992: 19). Although Atatürk exerted great weight and decisiveness in the creation of foreign policy (Davison, 1994: 172-209), he had given importance to the experts’ opinions in this process, carefully examined the report of the Ministry, and had long discussions with diplomats and managers around him (Uzgel, 2012: 74). During this period, İsmet
Inönü, who served for a short time as foreign minister and intermittent prime minister, and Tevfik Rüştû Aras, who served as foreign minister between 1925 and 1938, were two prominent figures in foreign policy, but they were mostly practitioners (Şimşir, 1996: 74).

We can say that foreign policy of Atatürk’s period had a particular theoretical framework. The theoretical framework of the period’s foreign policy was “Peace at home, peace in the world.” principle. Turkey revealed its internal and external policies within the framework of “Peace at home, peace in the world.” principle. In domestic politics, in order to establish a Western-oriented scheme, many steps were especially educational, politic, social and economic. In foreign policy, Turkey was in a sense to embrace existing borders, not claim a right on the territory of other states. Similarly, other countries were to not claim a right on Turkey’s territory. This theoretical framework had tried to find place in practice. In spite of all the difficulties, Turkey, after its success in the War of Independence, achieved its purpose of building “national” government (Gönlübol, 1992: 21-25). This national government was to have a “fully independent” structure, which was free from all foreign interventions and privilege (Gönlübol, 1992: 27). This was the basic condition for both independent domestic and foreign policies. Turkey was founded on Ottoman Empire’s territory and its foreign policy in the first period was parallel to the Ottoman Empire’s foreign policy, which they had applied from the 17th century. As Baskın Oran stresses, Turkey guided its foreign policy in accordance with “monitoring the balance of power carefully to live in advantage of it” and “not making war between other states if there is no threat of invasion” principles like as its predecessor Ottoman Empire (Oran, 2012: 19). The basic principle of this term is “the balance of power”. Because of the problems with the West, the newly established Republic preferred to have relation with the Soviet Union although it desired to be close to the West. While trying to benefit by taking advantage of the conflict between the Western great powers, Atatürk attached great importance to gaining the Soviet Union’s military and political support.

Going through important wars like Balkan Wars, the World War I and the War of Independence, Turkey was oriented to the West. However, this orientation does not mean, Turkey was insensitive to regional events and events occurring in the world. Indeed, at nation-building process, executives -who have adopted Western values- approach in the domestic policy is normal. However, claiming that Turkey had no policy towards Eastern countries in terms of foreign policy is not very realistic. Moreover, when we analyze the situation of the Middle East countries with which Turkey did not develop foreign policy, we can state that those countries were influenced by Western powers like USA, Britain and France. In other words, Turkey carried out its relations with these countries through Western powers that ruled the region during the period.

In Selim Deringil’s words, “During this period, executive of the Republic is realistic about the constraints that necessarily reflect present political, military capabilities and social materials (Deringil, 1985: 94).” During this period, Turkey tried to take part in the international arena by using diplomatic elements as well. Thus Turkey tried to improve its general bargaining power by compensating for its success in the

---

1 The first foreign minister of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, founded on May 2, 1920, was Bekir Sami Bey. Yusuf Kemal (Tengirjenk) Bey, took Bekir Sami Bey’s position after his resignation in 1921 London Conference (Gögin, 1994: 117); One of the Ministry’s organizational processes following three ambassadors and envoys during this period came from the Ottoman Hariciyesi (Şimşir, 1996: 75).

2 Due to the Liberation War efforts, Turkey or even its Ottoman Empire heritage gave the perspective of a continuously struggle surrounded by inside and outside enemies. Because of that, Turkey’s defense staff have two important objectives such as maintaining territorial integrity and the independence of the country against all enemies (Erol & Ozan, 2011: 23); (Bilgin, 2003: 208-210).

3 Baskın Oran defines the Republic of Turkey, founded as the continuation of the post-17th century Ottoman Empire in the same geography, with the same people, as a “medium-sized state” and draws attention to their similarities (Oran, 2012: 19); (Aydın, 2005: 50); According to Selim Deringil, the Republic inherited five characteristics from the Ottoman foreign policy and diplomacy: “fine-tuning in policies”, “knowing your way around the international law”, “importance of intelligence”, “avoidance of adventures, instead caution and reality” and “not to remain isolated in an imminent crisis from the military and diplomatic perspectives (Alpay & Kayas, 1996: 18).

4 For a comparison of foreign policy between Abdulhamid II period of the Ottoman Empire (1876-1908) period and in İnönü period at Republic during World War II (1938-1945) (Deringil, 1985: 83-107).

5 Atatürk defined “modernization” with “Westernization”; and used the two interchangeably. Yet, Turkey’s political inclination towards the West, and the roots of its desire to be part of Europe precede Atatürk. As a matter of fact, we see that the Ottoman Empire gravitated towards the West since its foundation. After its crossing to the European side, the Ottomans were constantly in relations and at the same time conflict with European states. As such, Europe’s fiercest battles have been against the Ottomans. The Ottoman danger forced the Europeans to unite under the flag of Crusades. Ottoman’s Westernization in legal domain goes back to the 1856 Paris Congress (Gönlübol, 1992: 33); In order to enhance its western side, the Turkish political regime renounced the heritage of the Empire, and took steps towards reducing the appearance of the religion in the public sphere through the formation of the newly-founded Republic in a Western model (Erol & Ozan, 2011: 23); (Bozdaglioğlu, 2003: 54).

6 Diplomacy is used as an active component in the War of Independence years. In those years diplomacy tool is used as a complementary manner in line with other war fighting tools. While using the Soviet Union to compensate the Allied forces, Ankara aimed to leave Greece that entered to Anatolia by taking advantage of the conflict in the Allies alone (Sönmezoğlu, 2001: 57); While trying to stay away from Italy and Germany that posed threats in this period, Turkey has tried to form regional alliances including Baghdad Pact and Sadabad Pact for its security (Hale, 2003, 55-56).
fields of policy to remedy its power in the military, economic and other fields.9 Being aware of its power and avoiding adventurous policies by taking cautious steps are important elements of this period. Not following an irredentist foreign policy after the Lausanne Treaty follows from this policy. Despite taking place in National Pact boundaries, Turkey has reacted to the separation of Mosul, Batumi and Western Thrace from Turkey in the frame of international law (Gönlübol, 1992: 25). Following a revisionist foreign policy during this period could not be expected from Turkey because it was in need of serious development in areas such as economy, military, and had fought tough wars that resulted in huge losses. This is not very realistic because the new state was being established, and Turkey was trying to consolidate the new regime. Turkey strived to resolve issues in accordance with international law in this period.10 In the process of solution of the Mosul question, Turkey’s questioning to the League of Nations’ (LN) authority to make binding decisions shows that the country acted within the framework of international law. At the same time, the withdrawal of its representative in Geneva against the decision of the League of Nations to leave Mosul to England at a meeting in which it did not participate is an indication that “soft power” stands out instead of “hard power” in Turkish foreign policy.

In summary, it can be said that the Turkish Foreign Policy in Atatürk’s period was drawn in accordance with certain principles and goals in line with internal and external conditions. The period in question is the period in which Turkish political regime was built and foreign policy principles were defined.

2.2. Turkish Foreign Policy, 1939-1945

Just as Atatürk’s period, during İsmet İnönü’s period as well, the leaders were the decision-makers (Erkin, 1980: 191). Following Atatürk’s death, İnönü, who became the president faced with World War II and was a former soldier, was active in foreign policy. Under the leadership of İnönü, who made inferences from World War II,11 Turkish foreign policy has pursued a “non-combat (non-belligerent)” policy at that period (Oran, 2012: 393).12 Although Turkey was supporting allied forces with UK’s leadership, it did not participate actively in the war by the time the war started to end. It set policy according to the course of the war. When it became clear that the war would end in favor of the Allies, Turkey joined the war in the last period of the war to take part in the structuring of the post-war order.

Turkey was aware of its capabilities and limitations in this period and did not risk endangering independence in foreign policy. During this process, Turkey worked to maintain a long-term non-combat position as stated above, and was successful in this goal. With this goal in mind, Turkey continued to cooperate with both sides and followed a distraction policy (Edward, 2000); (Deringil, 1994).

Due to take place on the side of the Allied powers won the war, the post-war period, most of the time in Turkey’s foreign policy paved the way for taking steps in this direction without question. The most important factor is the strict polarization of international system in the post-war period. On the basis of “providing the allies guarantee which would ensure the safety of Turkey without seen as the opposite to Soviet (Aydn, 2012: 475)”, Turkey tried to avert threats coming from its northern neighbor the Soviet Union by allying with Western powers, especially with United States. During this period, the Soviet Union’s demand on provinces such as Kars and Ardahan, and wish to have an authority in the Straits were the most important factors of Turkish foreign policy’s away from “balance” politic step by step and shaping with the framework of the Western Bloc.

2.3. Turkish Foreign Policy, 1945-1960

Polarization of the world by the end of the World War II was stricter and significant. During this period, the United States and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republic’s (USSR) West Block and East Block affected the foreign policy process of many countries. In this case, as in many states, Turkey also narrowed the room for maneuver in foreign policy. Turkey chose to take part in the US-led Western Bloc.13 Constructing its domestic and foreign policy parallel to USA and North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), Turkey

---

9 Hans Morgenthau describes “diplomatic skill” as “the most important element that makes up the power of a state (Morgenthau, 1973, 140).
10 Two most important samples of it are Montreux, 1936 which removed the sovereignty of limitations, and Hatay Issue, 1939 with which Hatay joined Turkey.
11 Both in İnönü and Atatürk periods, the military has tried to keep away from both internal and external policies. Atatürk’s policy to exclude military from policy has a significant impact on it.
12 Turkey is not neutral in this process; applied “active neutrality” policy that the main policy of it is remaining non-war but works for ensuring the interests with the framework of the circumstances by being in active communication with both sides (Criss, 2002-2003: 58).
13 Raymond Aron stresses that states cannot follow an independent policy at stricter blocking situations. Aron’s this opinion is called as “Aron Paradigm” (Aron, 1973: 125-127).
followed the foreign policy that was drawn in accordance with the classical realist political theory since the beginning.\textsuperscript{14}

In this period, experiencing the harshest years of the Cold War, Turkish foreign policy was laid down in accordance with the system approach. System’s approach (Waltz, 1996) assertions to that the foreign policy of the state is determined in the international environment. Indeed, Turkish foreign policy was dependent on and determined by the politics between blocks.

Turkish foreign policy used political, ideological and military methods and tools. Both with Westernization and the state’s historical background and foundation of the principles, Turkey used “realist skepticism and hard power” tools (Gözen, 2010: 23). Economic, commercial and social relations, called “low politics”, remained in a parallel way to the determination of ideological, military and political relations’, called “high politics” (Gözen, 2010: 23).

The importance of the geopolitical conditions of the period let Turkey stand out in the international system. Although Turkey was pushed into a satellite position by Western Bloc’s great power United States, it generally played the role of “Medium State (Regional Power) (Oran, 2012: 29)” in Baskın Oran’s words. This concept that defined as;

“The state which has marginal effects on the international system; but may affect the regional policy (especially smaller neighbor), the more importantly can withstand to coercion from big states and can negotiate with them even can affect their certain behavior with better utilization of that day’s conditions (conjuncture) (Oran, 2012: 30).”

is the key point of Turkey’s political and economic reconstruction process with the aid of Truman Doctrine and Marshall.

The foreign policy was determined in accordance with the spirit of the Cold War during Democratic Party period. The first foreign minister Fuat Köprülü was a reputable historian and political identity. Because of the lack of his diplomat identity, Adnan Menderes gave importance to experienced bureaucracy in foreign policy between the years 1950-1957. During this period, the State Department moved to the building next to the prime ministry building, and intelligent and experienced diplomats like Fatih Rüştü Zorlu, Muharrem Nuri Birgi, and Melih Esenbel Kuneralp were appointed (Uzgel, 2012: 76). The second foreign minister of Menderes period was Fatih Rüştü Zorlu, and was very effective in determining the foreign policy in the years 1957-1960 thanks to his diplomatic identity. Democratic Party’s entering a challenging period in the internal politics was influential in this orientation. With the spirit of the Cold War, troops were sent to the Korean War. The country became a member of NATO, the military support of the Western Bloc, the military wing of Baghdad and played an active role in the establishment of Baghdad Entente.\textsuperscript{15} Thanks to the stability in domestic affairs, the government found enough time and opportunity to deal with foreign policy (Uzgel, 2012: 77). While sending troops to the Korean War for the NATO membership symbolized the continuity of diplomatic maneuvers, it also symbolized a political break of Turkish foreign policy with regard to the decision-making process as well as from Atatürk’s “Peace at home, peace in the world” policy. Namely, the decision to send soldiers was taken without consulting the Parliament and the opposition party and was subject to the discourse of violating the constitution. Another case is the first exit out of the boundaries of the National Pact, which was a turning point in the historical evolution of Turkish foreign policy. Becoming a member of NATO and “too Western, less West” attitude that Turkey exhibited at the Bandung Conference in 1955, “too Western-oriented from the West” led to a foreign policy considered as “an important break with the cautious neutrality policy in Kemalism foreign affairs” (Zürcher, 2015: 341).

2.4. Turkish Foreign Policy, 1960-1980

“The principle of ‘Peace at home and in the world.’ set by the great Atatürk is our flag. We are loyal to all our alliances and undertakings. We believe in the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation and the Central Treaty Organisation, and we are faithful to them. We repeat our ideal is peace at home, peace in the world (Aydn & Taşkm, 2005: 63).”

\textsuperscript{14} For the work of Gözen which stressed that Turkish foreign policy is based on the realist theory (Gözen, 2009).

\textsuperscript{15} As Faruk Sönmezoglu stressed that in this period, Turkey’s national security policy has become synonymous with NATO (Sönmezoglu, 2006: 25-26).
Although these statements of coup declaration on 27 May 1960, the first military coup of Turkey, caused significant breaking point in Turkish political life, they were also indicative of the continuity of Western oriented foreign policy. Indeed, putschists brought Selim Sarper to the head of the Foreign Ministry in order to maintain good relations with the West. Control of the Turkish foreign policy was in the hands of National Unity Committee which governed the country during the coup period. In this period, the name of “Hariciye Vekaleti” was changed to the “Dışişleri Bakanlığı (Ministry of Foreign Affairs), and an effort was shown to reduce the effects of Menderes era staff.

Johnson’s Letter\(^6\) in the process of Cyprus issue after 1960 caused disappointment with the West. This is important in providing a basis for transition toward multi-dimensionality in foreign policy and interrogation of West “addicted” foreign policy (Uzgel, 2012: 78).\(^5\) During this period, it is seen that press and public began to be effective in the process of foreign policy making, thanks to a relative autonomy climate, brought by the 1961 Constitution. Foreign policy, which was under the dominance of the leader in both Atatürk and İnönü periods, and was identified by the leader together with a narrow group in Menderes period, could now be criticized and debated both by the press and public (Uzgel, 2012: 78). Leaders tried to gain popularity in domestic policy by effecting the public (Uzgel, 2012: 79). It paved the way for a more active and direct participation of the army in foreign policy making process, not only by founding National Security Council as a constitutional institution connected directly to Prime Minister, but also by empowering the Council to inform Cabinet about their views regarding decisions on national security.

In Süleyman Demirel period, who was an engineer, foreign policy was conducted by İhsan Sabri Çağlayangil and his team. Çağlayangil paid great attention to the Ministry bureaucracy. Unlike Demirel, Bülent Ecevit tried to be effective and took direct initiative. Indeed, Ecevit’s attitude led to the resignation of the Foreign Minister Turan Güneş. Gündüz Ökçun replaced Güneş.

The most important problem of Ecevit’s period was the Cyprus issue. Cyprus Peace Operation was carried out in a specific plan and system after multilateral discussions within the country (Gürel, 1984). Many discussions were held in National Security Council, Joint Chiefs of Staff and Ministry of Foreign Affairs. The operation was questioned on the grounds of its conformity with international law; The Council gathered and Cyprus Coordinating Committee was established. During this whole process, Ecevit did not neglect to inform the other political party leaders (Kesgin, 2007: 241-343); (Yavuzalp, 1996). Turkey took steps towards multi-dimensional foreign policy between 1960 and 1980. During this period, effectiveness of some factors such as public, army and political parties began to increase in decision-making processes (Uzgel, 2012: 80).

2.5. Turkish Foreign Policy, 1980-1990

In the period following the 1980 coup, foreign policy rigidly came under the influence of the US. Just as in the case of the 1960 coup, although putschists brought a diplomat, İltür Türkmén, to head of Foreign Ministry, Kenan Evren was the only decision-maker in foreign policy. Evren, who disregarded of the opinion of Foreign Ministry, caused Turkey to lose an important trump card against Greece with his decision on the Rogers Plan that allowed Greece’s return to NATO’s military wing.

During this period, the impact of the press, public opinion and intellectuals was eliminated from foreign-policy decision-making process, while serious measures were taken in domestic policies to ensure an apolitical society. In addition, the number of military personnel and authorities was raised at National Security Council (NSC) to increase the influence of army in decision making process. As stressed by İlhan Uzgel, the provision that NSC’s decisions on national security will be “primarily taken into account” by politicians indicated the increasing effects of army on decision making process (Uzgel, 2012: 81).

In this period, the country adopted a liberal economy policy. Turgut Özal (1983-1989 Prime Minister; 1989-1993 President), believed that Turkey had to quickly adopt the liberal economy, smooth the way for economy in order to become more effective in foreign policy. This led businesses to increase their influence in the decision making process. Özal kept control of decision making process by the time of progress, and traditional institutions such as Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Army and the Parliament were pushed outside the process. Instead of traditional institutions, individuals such as journalists, without

---

\(^{6}\) For Johnson’s Letter and its effects (Şahin, 1987).

\(^{5}\) Although Turkey is a member of NATO, could not get the support of this Block on Cyprus issue. Moreover, the Block has applied an embargo to Turkey. As a result, Turkey has recognized the need of pursuing a non-ideological foreign policy. During this period, it has been began to discriminate between Soviet Union and communism and to establish political and economic relations with Soviets. It has been also started to establish relations with non-Aligned Movement.
formal qualifications, began to participate in decision-making and diplomatic processes (Uzgel, 2012: 81). Furthermore, some businessmen began to behave like diplomats. Seeing bureaucracy as an obstacle in both domestic and foreign policy-making processes, Özal aimed to change the foreign policy itself and its methods to overcome this obstacle.

Once he became the president in 1989, Özal gave more weight to one-man rule in foreign policy, which can be analogized to Napoleon’s expression of “Conditions? I make the conditions (Spykman, 2013: 3).” It will not be wrong to assess that foreign policy of this period remained in the shadow of Özal’s dominant character. In 1990-91 Gulf War, Özal conducted “telephone diplomacy” with US President (Father) Bush to shape Turkey’s foreign policy to the exclusion of The Chief of Defense Necip Torumtay. Indeed, Torumtay resigned in this process. As highlighted above, Özal took steps to exclude the Turkish Armed Forces as well as the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Instead of foreign affairs bureaucracy, Özal chose to work with diplomats and people who would obey him without causing any troubles. Although Özal stayed in power for a long time, Ministry of foreign Affairs, which is a cornerstone of the country and for which continuity is a must for stability, changed many diplomats including Vahit Halefoğlu, Mesut Yılmaz, Ali Bozer, Ahmet K. Alptemoçin and Safa Giray. It is important to point out that how ineffective Özal made the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in the decision-making process.

The principle of “foreign policy over parties”, which was a significant factor of Turkish foreign policy for a long time, was marginalized. Unlike the previous periods, foreign policy issues were used intensively as domestic policy tools rather than seeing those issues as interests of the country or carrying them out with the consensus of the traditional state discipline (Criss, 2002-2003: 152).

2.6. Turkish Foreign Policy, 1990-2002

The structure of the international system underwent a radical change at the end of Cold War. Turkey got caught unprepared to new conditions as many other countries, which conducted their foreign policy in accordance with the rigid and severe structure of the Cold War. President Özal and Prime Minister Demirel tried to penetrate Euroasia by attaching special importance to the region and using “the unity of culture, history and language” of the region.

Turkey improved economic, commercial, energy, social and contractorship relations with the Middle Eastern countries and the Soviet Union in those years. Likewise, five countries in the Middle East, Iraq, Iran, Libya, Saudi Arabia and Kuwait, became the largest foreign partners of Turkey; financial, commercial and economic relations with Soviet Union were increasing with each passing day. Improving relations both Soviet Union and Middle East led to a decrease in ideological securitization that may come from those years, Turkey tried to penetrate the geography of Turkic Republics by taking advantage of the gap that occurred in the aftermath of the collapse of the Soviet Union. However, these policies brought about undesired results because of the inclusion of Neo-Ottoman intentions. Such relations developed since the mentioned countries showed parallel progress as the US and NATO’s strategies, rather than alternative relations to the West. Indeed, Turkey conducted its relations in the framework of Iranian Revolution, The Iran-Iraq War, and Arab-Israeli conflict.18

It is difficult to speak of a certain stability in foreign policy during the coalition periods that followed Özal. Necmettin Erbakan, Prime minister of Refah-Yol government, wished to turn the direction of Turkish foreign policy to Islamic and Eastern countries completely. Hence, these wishes reverberated in Turkish foreign policy as well. In this period, Turkey was the initiator of the D-8 project and led to foreign policy changes toward Iran and Middle East countries. Thus, being effective in both domestic and foreign policy, the army removed the Refah-Yol government from power with postmodern coup after a while.

2.7. Turkish Foreign Policy after 2002: Turkey’s New Foreign Policy Concept (?)

The structure of international system that emerged after the Cold War has revised Turkey’s foreign policy. In this way, it has made sense to carry out a completely Western orientation and a policy adapted to the West. The disappearance of the sharp polarity with the end of Cold War revealed both uncertainty and significant opportunities for countries. In this respect, Turkish foreign policy of wanting to become an

---

18 The most important indication of this is a policy that Turkey followed in 1990-1991 Gulf War. In this war, although Iraq became the largest trade and economic partner, Turkey implemented an embargo on Iraq, participated in the operation at certain levels and supported policies of Gulf Coalition led by US (Gözen, 2010: 24-25).
influential country in the region should be in a multi-dimensional expansion. This multi-dimensional opening, as stated above, was revealed as of Ismail Cem’s period.

That policy has been maintained in the Justice and Development Party [JDP - Adalet ve Kalkınma Partisi (AK Party)] period as well. In this context, Davutoğlu’s expression about the shifting of Turkish foreign policy paradigm (Davutoğlu, 2013: 16) in the JDP period is right, but not the first. Still, it can be said that the strength of political will in foreign policy of the JDP period has come into prominence as Davutoğlu theorized and underlined.\(^{19}\) Foreign policy of the JDP period has been determined in the framework of principles that are put forward in Davutoğlu’s book “Strategic Depth” (Davutoğlu, 2008: 31-34). As Davutoğlu expressed, these principles are “freedom-security balance”, “zero problems with neighboring countries and efficiency in neighboring basins”, “multi-dimensional and multi-lane foreign policy”, “new diplomatic style and methods” and “rhythmic diplomacy and expanding into new basins” (Davutoğlu, 2013: 16); (Davutoğlu, 2008).

In Davutoğlu’s words, Turkey feels the need to take responsibilities and duties of history of all geographic depth for itself, because Turkey considers itself not an ordinary nation-state in the region, but deep-rooted in relations with the regional states (Davutoğlu, 2013: 16). According to this understanding, Turkey must follow every development in the Middle East and the Caucasus, which Davutoğlu describes as land basin near Turkey. Located in the center of Eurasia, Turkey is a central country that has the power to affect a wide area. Even the slightest movement in these regions would lead to a volatility for Turkey (Davutoğlu, 2013: 16). Therefore, Turkey must adopt this historical mission and play a role in accordance with its rich background and historical ties with the region.

In cases where these principles of foreign policy formed on the basis of theoretical framework are transferred into practice, different problems could occur. Considering the historical process, Turkey has vital interests with its neighboring countries.\(^{20}\) In such a clear and obvious case, Turkey’s unilateral steps in the basis of Strategic Depth indicated that this process would end up unfavorable.\(^{21}\) On the other hand, Turkey’s qualification towards other countries in the region as periphery by positioning itself as the center has led to formidable deadlocks in Turkish foreign policy. As Oran stressed, Turkey is located within interlock security orbits. Turkey must ensure a harmony between these security orbits that affect the balance of power and consist of extremely artificial boundaries. At the same time, these orbits mean dilemmas for Turkey (Oran, 2012: 25).

Davutoğlu, “the brain and planner” (Efegil, 2010: 108) of the JDP’s foreign policy, was the most important person in giving direction to foreign policy during his duty of Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Prime Minister’s Foreign Policy Adviser. Davutoğlu aimed a stable foreign policy, conducted along the lines of certain principles. On the other hand, the principles set out and the applicability of these principles show that it is very difficult for the institutionalization expected to be put forward only by Davutoğlu. Erdoğan is also another determining factor of foreign policy in the framework of his personal characteristics. In the JDP period, to inform public about foreign policy has been largely disregarded.

Davutoğlu’s efficient role in the last decade of Turkish foreign policy is an indication of the lack of Turkey’s long term strategic plan. Davutoğlu’s strategic theory aimed to overcome this deficiency. But,

\(^{19}\) Davutoğlu assess political will as a determinant of strategy (Davutoğlu, 2008: 31-34).

\(^{20}\) İlhan Uzgel claims that Davutoğlu’s zero problem policy with neighbors is unrealistic when it is considered both philosophical and historical-geographical features of Turkey (Uzgel, 2012).

\(^{21}\) As stressed by İlhan Uzgel, Turkish Foreign Policy has tried to discredit its own history and thus legitimize itself. In this process, JDP has exaggeratedly identified Turkey’s position in regional and global politics. In this period that distinction of foreign and domestic policy has constantly been disregarded, likewise previous administrations, JDP, real representatives of society, has underlined that Turkey will be an founding country in the region as well as a leader of regional politics (Uzgel, 2012); In this process, there was a Turkey continuously throwing up all the balls that she has. But there was something that foreign policy-makers has taken any notice: the ball will fall down when reach maximum point. The most important thing in this return process is to have success. Considering the Turkish foreign policy in 2011, it was seen clearly the limits of foreign policy capacity and the construction of foreign policy on misleading axioms. As Lesser highlights there was the problem of the determination of priorities in JDP foreign policy administration (Lesser, 2008: 16); As stressed by İlhan Uzgel, All the experienced problems is in the region of Middle East that Davutoğlu claims he knows the politics, society and problems of Middle East very well. On the other side, he has criticized Kemalist regime because the regime has ignored this region. Neither Davutoğlu nor JDP could foresee Arab Spring in the region where they claimed that they knew society and politics of the region very well. Moreover, before the Arab Spring, they accepted Gaddafi’s international human rights award and invited Assad’s for vacation in Turkey. After Arab Spring, these good ties were changed (Uzgel, 2012); At this point, “theory-practice clarity” in foreign policy needs to be emphasized. In JDP period, it has been seen a discourse that is beyond “the ability of capacity and action” in foreign policy (Kurban, 2016); This kind of discourse aimed to effect public in internal politics. However, unless the discourse is supported by actions, it can be concluded loss of credibility. Indeed, in the end, when Turkey face challenges and troubles, it can be said that “We overcome this understanding and problem is not in Turkey but neighbors”. So and so, Foreign policy of Davutoğlu who does not accept any criticism and see criticisms as an maliciousness of some of people who wish Davutoğlu’s unsucces, is like “a truck breaking its blakes and going downhill” (Özdemir, 2013).
constituting strategic theories cannot rely solely on scientific works of individuals, personal views and experience. In order to make clear decisions in the process of constituting foreign policy, an active interaction between policy-makers and practitioners of foreign policy on the one hand, university experts and research institutions is needed.

Foreign policy has been consistently used as a factor for domestic policy in the JDP period. In the first period, the party conducted foreign policy in accordance with the demands of classic decision-makers in order to ensure its legitimacy across the country. In other words, foreign policy was used with the aim of bringing domestic policy in legitimacy. Thus, the JDP created an “opportunity area” of converting internal policy (İnat & Duran, 2006: 31). On October 3, in 2005, Turkey and EU commenced full negotiations and passed many reforms in both economic and political matters on the EU path by following foreign policy proper to liberal and neo-liberal theory. During this period, foreign policy tools such as military and strategy were replaced by human rights, economy and identity.

Although Turkish foreign policy of the JDP period was introduced as changes and transformations, it can be said that pursued policies were based on NATO and the US. Indeed, it is unlikely for Turkey to take steps in foreign policy by disregarding West because Turkey is part of many Western based international organizations. In spite of differences in the levels of discourse, this is the case in practice. As mentioned above, Turkey’s active policies toward Islamic and Middle Eastern countries can be explained by change occurring in the international system after the September 11 rather than the abandonment of the traditional understanding. This process is a result of a compromise between Turkey’s position by arising from the JDP’s rule and the new hegemonic and imperial power of the US (Gözeń, 2010: 32). In other words, favorable conditions of the system have increased the importance of Turkey.

The US and Turkey took joint steps to design Middle East, Caucasus and Balkans as part of their cooperation. At this point, the steps taken by the JDP government in the framework of Neo-Ottomanism has not been in conflict with NATO’s or other Western countries’ policies. New focus of global competition has been shifting from Eurasia to Asia-Pacific because of a systematic change in the international system. In this process, Turkey’s penetration to challenging issues such as existing problems in Caucasus, Iran nuclear efforts and Iraq did not bother the US and other Western countries. This is because Turkey is a NATO ally with its economic and diplomatic power, Israel’s “friend”, an EU candidate and an energy route to West. Indeed, the US Secretary of State visiting Ankara said that “we are neither uncomfortable nor bewildered from Turkey’s active policies in Middle East” (Strauss, 2009). The US Assistant Secretary of State Douglas Feith said “We encourage Turkey to play regional leadership role.” in 2005, during his visit of Turkey. Furthermore, In March 2009, US Secretary of State Hillary Clinton described Turkey as the “leader of the Middle East”. Similar statements have been expressed by senior personnel of both sides. In Davutoğlu’s words, “The interests of Turkey and Obama administration overlap one hundred percent.” (Çakırözer, 2009). During his Ankara visit in April 2009, Obama highlighted the consensus of two countries on Iraq, Syria, Iran, Armenia, Palestine and other regional and global issues. Obama called the relations of the two countries as a “model partnership”.

3. CONCLUSION: RETHINKING THE TURKISH FOREIGN POLICY AGAIN

Turkey has positioned itself in the center in the uncertain international environment of Post-Cold War. In this period, Turkey has been described with expressions such as “leader of Turkish world”, “regional leaders in the center of Eurasian geopolitics”, “the country determining the global agenda” and “center of regional attraction”. This boldness in the discourse, however, did not translate fully into practice. Foreign policy-makers facing these adverse conditions have felt the need to change their foreign policies. Mismanagement of this process has damaged the determination and seriousness of foreign policy decisions.

Bearing in mind of theory-practice conceptualization, it is observed that Turkish foreign policy could not reveal an approach establishing such kind of a theory-practice relation except Atatürk’s period. Although, Davutoğlu’s recent studies aimed to overcome the lack of theory in foreign policy, the theoretical framework of these studies has remained insufficient. Turkey strongly needs this type of studies that rely on theory and give direction to foreign policy. To do this, in Davutoğlu’ words, Turkey should constitute a strategic theory on the basis of “geo-political, geo-cultural and geo-economic realities” (Davutoğlu, 1995: 497). Definitely, a strategic theory must take into consideration not only the realities of country, but also
the international realities. Although Davutoğlu’s strategic theory is consistent in itself, the theory has faced serious problems in practice because it ruled out the international realities.

Turkey should act proactively so as to achieve a dominant power position in the region. A dominant Turkey in the region will become a more effective actor in international system. It requires constructive, active and multi-dimensional foreign policy understanding. However, it should be noted that there are strategic determinants of this kind of foreign policy, such as consistency, foresight, consensus building, process management, result management.

Turkey has wished to pursue an active foreign policy. For this purpose, firstly, Turkey should achieve certain qualities and quantities in domestic policy. Unless Turkey solves the fundamental problems, such as the PKK, democratization and human rights in domestic politics, domestic politics will constitute permanent obstacles to foreign policy. When Turkey obtains inner peace and tranquility, the separatist movements that may come from different groups can be eliminated. Likewise, Turkey can minimize interference on the country. To this end, Turkey needs to develop policies that are based on a social contract and assure solidarity and unity in the country. On the other hand, an effective foreign policy must go beyond a regional power target rhetoric. In this context, Turkey should reach a significant economic, social, cultural and political level (Laçınier, 2010: 3). Thus, long-term goals and general principles can only be meaningful when they are associated with the country’s international positions and power factor (Aydın, 2005: 48).

Unlike the policies of Özal period, Turkey should develop policies on the political and cultural basis rather than ethnic origin, language and religion in its relations with Islamic and Middle Eastern countries (Bilgin, 205: 87-124). Moreover, Turkey should attribute an economic meaning to these policies. To the extent Turkey achieves these policies, it will gain more influence in the region. Thus, Turkey should follow more coherent and stable policies than it did the past. At this point, the perceptions of those taking part in decision making process of Turkish foreign policy are important. In this context, Foreign Ministry, effective in state’s policy making and implementation process, should play a more active role. As such, Turkey can minimize the problems that results from both internal and external structures.

Desire to be a dominant power requires new roles and capabilities. Considering these facts, it appears that Turkey’s new foreign policy pursued in recent years does not have the necessary skills. Although Turkey pursues a risk-taking, active and multi-dimensional foreign policy, this role is the result of the new roles that Turkey was faced with because of its geopolitical positions and changes in international system, rather than a choice that results from the impact of the country’s own humanitarian, cultural, economic and political accumulation (Özdemir, 2013).

As stated above, new focus of global competition has shifted from Eurasia to Asia-Pacific in this period. Thus, Turkey is regarded as an important country that will fill in the power vacuum for the US. This approach shows that Turkey still pursues its foreign policy in the framework of “US and NATO dependent”. Although some foreign policy expressions such as “independent regional leader” and “independent foreign policy” come into prominence in discourse, this indicates that Turkey’s capacity is still not sufficient such a policy.

Turkey will never be ignored by global powers due to its strategic and geographic location. Turkey is located at the intersection of three religions, three continents and many cultures. Moreover, Turkey is located in the heart of world’s energy resources, primarily natural gas and oil lines. So, taking part in world’s conjuncture in a passive way is impossible for Turkey due to its geo-strategic positions.

Nowadays, there is a view that claims to be Turkish policy in “structural governance crisis”. The costs of losing the big picture within the daily crises can be high. Transforming Turkish foreign policy into a domain in which those with political power implement their political worldview can lead to unfavorable developments.

Turkish foreign policy should be able to pursue an approach that respects economic, social, military, political and cultural values. Although foreign policy is based on ideals in discourse, it is the power that gives a direction to foreign policy in practice. In this context, problems should be handled with data. The process of foreign policy planning and execution is liable to both internal and external effects. The importance of data streams is crucial at this point. The cumulative review can help with action styles through the assessment of obtained data. An appropriate action in foreign policy will facilitate the process of foreign policy implementation. When Turkey acquires these elements, it can pursue a foreign policy in
the context of long term goals and principles rather than a cyclical, fear-based and crisis-oriented foreign policy.

Ministry of Foreign Affairs should have a policy-planning that is a real-sense and complies with the contemporary requirements. Besides, it should introduce medium and long term policy planning. Foreign policy alternatives should be discussed and planned. An institutional work should be revealed to constitute intellectual alternatives for applied current ministry market under the new data and conditions. Domination of personal characters, social and sociological values and decision makers’ ideological understandings in foreign policy making process can be prevented in this way. This case supports institutionalization but it also prevents foreign policy change after a government change. Having a theoretical aspect of foreign policy-making process will make a sustainable foreign policy (Keyman, 2009: 7-27). For this purpose, the foreign ministry should be the most effective actor both in foreign policy making process and foreign policy planning process. The Ministry should construct an institutional work to provide “an alternative foreign policy approaches” taking into consideration new data and principles (Oran, 2012: 54-73). Ministry of Foreign Affairs must have a good planning process. At this point, the important factor is that The Ministry should have experienced experts who know the regions, regional languages.

In essence, we can draw an analogy between theory and practice relations and Plato’s cave allegory. In order to be an effective country at the point where historical evolution reaches in, Turkish foreign policy must be in an multi-dimensional opening by breaking chains, just the same as prisoners are freed from the cave, come to understand reality of shadows by getting close to the daylight. However, this opening should take into account international real facts. Otherwise, Turkey will have to overcome unexpected scenarios when feelings get ahead of logic and wisdom, and national interests are disregarded.

REFERENCES


