Individual Forms in Aristotle's Substance Theory

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Year-Number: 2022-94
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Number of pages: 246-255
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Abstract

Aristoteles’in töz anlayışı güncel bir anlaşmazlığa sebep olmaktadır. Bu anlaşmazlık temel olarak Aristoteles tözlerinin tekil mi yoksa tümel mi olduğu problemine dayanmaktadır. Aristoteles'in Metafizik Zeta'da ortaya koyduğu ölçütlerin çoğuna göre form töz olarak tanımlanır. Öte yandan Aristoteles, Zeta ve özellikle 13. ve 16. bölümlerde hiçbir tümelin töz olamayacağını açıkça belirtir. Zeta boyunca Aristoteles’in formun tekil mi yoksa tümel mi olduğu konusunda açık olmadığı da analiz edilebilir. 13. bölüm gereğince eğer form töz ise onun aynı zamanda bireysel olması beklenmektedir. Ancak, Aristoteles'in tümeller bilinebilir olduğu için tikellerin bilinemeyeceğini söylediği birçok örnek vardır. Bu bakımdan töz bir yandan tikel ise, tözlerin bilinebilirliği konusunda ciddi problemler ortaya çıkmaktadır. Bu problemler özetle Aristoteles’in formun hem tümel hem de tikel olabileceğini açıkça belirtmemesinden de kaynaklanmaktadır. Problemi daha net analiz edebilmek üzere bu çalışma Aristoteles metinlerinde formların dolayısıyla tözün tikel ve tümel olduğunun vurgulandığı metinleri incelemeyi, ve tikel şeylerin tümellerin birer örnekleri olarak hem töz olabileceği hem bilebileceği ifade edilecektir.

Keywords

Abstract

There has been contemporary disagreement about Aristotle`s substance theory. This disagreement has mainly focused on the problem of whether Aristotelian forms are individual or universal. According to the majority of the criteria which are stipulated by Aristotle in Metaphysics Zeta, forms are substances. On the other hand, Aristotle also explicitly outlines in the Zeta, and especially chapters 13 and 16, that no universal can be a substance. At these points in his work, Aristotle should have been clearer regarding whether forms are universals or individuals. In terms of the conclusion Chapter 13 of Zeta, as well as some other criteria, one may conclude that, if substance is form, then it should be individual. There are many instances, however, where Aristotle says that, since universals are knowable, particulars cannot be known. It seems that, if substances are particulars on the one hand, it is hard to see how they can be knowable. Furthermore, if they are universal, it is hard to say whether individual forms are substances. Since Aristotle never mentioned whether forms could be both universal and particular, this causes difficulties. In order to examine this problem in more depth, I will not only analyse some textual evidence which is often used to justify the view that forms are universal, but also some textual evidence which is used to justify the view that forms are particular. In so doing, I will also identify some possible solutions regarding the problem of the status of forms in Aristotle`s substance theory. Lastly, I will suggest that individual forms are substances because they are instances of universals and, hence, may be knowable.
 

Keywords


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